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ABSTRACT
In this study we test the hypotheses that a reduction in the
control exerted by a firm's board of directors and/or an increase in the
concentration of the market in which the firm operates result in more,
real or potential, managerial control which, in turn, result in higher
compensation for chief executives, a form of expense preference behavior.
We test these hypotheses on a sample of 227 national banks located in
Illinois and Michigan. Banks provide a particularly appropriate source
for testing these hypotheses because data on salaries are readily available
and regulation of banks is generally assumed to restrict competition in
bank markets.
Empirical results of our study lead to rejection of the hypothesis
that management control results in greater compensation of the chief
operating officer. Similarly no difference was found in the factors
that influence the level of executive compensation between the manage-
ment controlled and the owner controlled firms.
Nonprofit maximizing behavior by firms in the private sector has
been the subject of substantial attention in the literature. When
noncompetitive conditions exist in the market and there is a separa-
tion of control between management and owners, behavior of firms may
lead to manager's or executive's maximizing their utility functions
subject to a minimum profit constraint. The elements of the chief oper-
ating executive's utility functions have been alleged to include risk
aversion, sales or growth maximization, managerial emoluments, and
executive compensation.
In this study the hypotheses are tested that a reduction in the
control of the firm by its board of directors and/or an increase in the
concentration of the market in which the firm operates result in more,
real or potential, managerial control which, in turn, result in chief
executives paying themselves more salary. The hypotheses are tested
2
on a sample of 227 national banks located in Illinois and Michigan."
Banks provide a particularly appropriate source for testing these
hypotheses because data on salaries are readily available; regulation
of banks limits entry and price flexibility thus restricting competition;
and substantial variation exists in the degree of bank ownership held
and controlled by the bank boards.
The Theory of Expense Preference Behavior: General Background
3
Berle and Means, in their classic study, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property
,
were the first to systematically recognize that the
growth of the large corporation in the U.S. led to the separation of
control from the ownership of the corporation. As ownership in many
corporations becomes dispersed among the shareholders, managers
-2-
gain control of the corporation. That is, they gain substantial
discretionary power to pursue the maximization of their utility
4
functions. Some of the elements that make up managers' utility
functions could be at variance with profit maximization, the obvious,
singular goal of ownership.
Specifically, the managers' utility function may contain as elements
over which it is maximized, growth, total size, risk aversion, and
managerial emoluments, in addition to firm profits. Any of the former
elements can be varied at the discretion of the manager so long as
they do not result in profits falling below some level that activates
the concern of the diverse stockholders and results in a management
takeover by a new group of management.
Of particular interest in this paper is a form of manager emolument,
the compensation of the chief executive officer (CEO). In a profit
maximizing firm, any input, including the CEO, should be employed to
the point where the marginal revenue product is equated to the price
of the input, or total compensation in case of the CEO. However, since
there is only one CEO the factor causing the MRP to differ is hetero-
geneous in quality. Thus, it is difficult or impossible to find a
direct measure of the MRP of the CEO, or to separate that of the CEO
from a larger group of management within the same firm. However, the
CEO may have more control over the level of his/her own compensation
in a managerial controlled firm than in a stockholder controlled firm.
The literature has responded to various aspects of two questions.
First, to what extent is the compensation of CEOs determined by the
profit maximizing criteria? Second, do the level and determinants of
-3-
corapensation of CEOs differ between managerial and owner controlled
firms?
Numerous studies have hypothesized that compensation is more
directly correlated with size than with profits or the degree of risk-
taking. As pointed out by Scherer, compensation may also be highly
correlated with size because larger firms require higher quality CEO's.
Compensation tends to be systematically related to profitability when
the effects of size are taken into account.
Masson found that the form of compensation significantly influences
the goals of the CEO. Specifically, he found that where a larger
proportion of the CEO's compensation is in profit oriented rewards, such
as bonuses and stock option plans, the CEOs of managerial controlled
firms have more incentive to profit-maximize than otherwise.
The Case of Commercial Banks
Commercial banks provide an interesting group of firms to which
the previous questions can be directed. As stated above two conditions
are necessary for nonprofit maximizing behavior to exist. The market
in which the firm operates must be noncompetitive. Commercial banks
operate in regulated markets in which certain forms of regulation reduce
the degree of competition. Entry is controlled in commercial banking.
New firms must apply for a charter to enter the market. One of the
issues appraised when charter applications are reviewed is the viability
of existing banks in Che market. Peltzman found that substantially
Q
fewer than the competitive number of banks exist in most markets. In
addition, various state and federal agencies regulate the structure of
banking firms, place restrictions on the banks' portfolios, and control
-4-
rates paid on liabilities and charged for assets. All of these controls
restrict, in one form or another, the level of corapetition in banking
markets. Thus, sufficient conditions for nonprofit maximizing behavior
are present.
The necessary condition usually assumed for expense preference
behavior to exist is a separation of ownership from control in the firm.
In some banks the board owns or controls enough stock to maintain
effective control of the firm. Sometimes, particularly in smaller
banks, the CEO owns controlling Interest; in other banks ownership is
very dispersed. In fact, in the sample of banks in this study, board
ownership of common stock outstanding ranged from 5 percent to 99
9
percent.
A particular phenomenon disclosed In past banking research, which
makes banks particularly suspect to expense preference behavior, is a
positive relationship between levels of monopoly power and bank prices
(interest rates and service charges). However, a similar relationship
is not found between levels of monopoly power and bank profits.
Edwards suggests that this discrepancy may be the result of banks
engaging In expense performance behavior "by paying [management]
higher salaries, hiring excessive staff, or being lax in their personnel
supervision...." Edwards then analyzes the extent of expense pref-
erence behavior exhibited in the labor force of banks. He finds the
12
coefficient on the three bank concentration ratio to be positive and
significantly correlated with both the bank's total labor force and the
bank's total wage bill. Thus, he concludes that expense preference
-5-
behavior is a significant force that detracts from profit maximization
in many banks.
The outlet for revenues that might otherwise enhance profits con-
sidered in this paper is the compensation of the CEO. The chief operating
officer is used as the CEO in this study. A model of executive compen-
sation is developed and tested in the next section of the paper with
more extensive measurements of the separation of ownership from control
than were available to Edwards.
Testing for Expense Preference Behavior in Bank Executives Compensation
The compensation of bank CEOs is estimated with a model that extends
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the work of McGuire et al., Lewellen, Yarrow, and others. A single
equation reduced form model is developed and tested using four groups
of variables. In all estimations the dependent variable is the sum of
salary and year end bonuses of the CEO reported to the Comptroller of
the Currency.
The first group of variables describes the difficulty of the CEO's
task of managing and coordinating, in terms of bank characteristics.
These include bank size, measured in terms of total bank deposits (TD).
The larger the bank, the more complex the chief executive's job. This
should be true even though the size of the entire management staff may
increase proportionately with the size of the bank, for the chief exec-
utive remains responsible for the coordination and administration of a
larger number of inputs (and, in the case of banking, possibly a larger
number of services or outputs). Another variable included in this
group is the number of branches (BR). Branches add to the complexity
of administration and coordination. Thus, a positive relationship should
16
exist between BR and compensation.
-6-
The loan to deposit ratio (L/D) , is included in this group of
variables as a measure of risk-taking by the bank. If bank ownership
imposes a higher L/D ratio on the CEO, thereby undertaking more risk,
the ownership should demand higher quality CEOs. Therefore, L/D
should be positively correlated with compensation of the CEO.
Finally, included in the first group of variables are measures of
bank performance. Bank performance should provide the feedback mecha-
nism by which executives are graded. Therefore, bank profits should be
positively related to compensation of the CEO. Two measures of bank
performance were used interchangeably in this study: net profit on
bank equity (P/E) and interest and fees on loans (IF/L).
The second group of variables describes human capital characteristics
of the CEO. This group includes the age of the CEO (AG) and the number
of years the individual has held the CEO's position (YR). Higher levels
of AG and YR indicate higher levels of human capital and should be
positively related to compensation of the CEO.
The third group of variables describes the market in which the bank
operates and from which the CEO is drawn. These demographic variables
include total population of the county in which the bank is located
(TPOP), income in the market (PCY) and the percent of the labor force in
the bank's market that is classified as professional (LFP). It is assumed
that executives will gravitate to those areas where salaries are the
highest. Therefore, LFP is a proxy for the market conditions for the
CEO.
-7-
The final group of variables measure the necessary and sufficient
conditions for expense perference behavior. Following the lead of
Edwards, market structure is used as a measure of the sufficient
conditions. However, unlike Edwards, who used the three firm concentra-
tion ratio, the Herfindahl Index (HF) is calculated for the county in
which the bank operates. The Herfindahl Index usually is considered
to be a superior measure of market structure because it includes all
firms in the industry and reduces the weight placed on the smallest
firms.
The necessary condition for expense preference behavior is separa-
tion of ownership and control. Two continuous variables are used
interchangeably. One measures the percent of common stock outstanding
owned by the board of directors of the bank (BOWN); the other measures
the percent of common stock outstanding controlled by the board of
directors (BCONT) . Data are collected for these variables from bank
examinations and reports banks must file with the Comptroller of the
Currency. Both the necessary and sufficient conditions should be
positively related to levels of compensation of the CEO if the banks
engage in expense preference behavior.
For large banks held by a holding company, ownership data are not
available In a form consistent with the data for nonheld banks. This
results in the eight largest banks in the region being omitted from
certain estimations. In an attempt to adjust for that omission the
19
model is estimated in three forms, two of which are reported.
-8-
The Empirical Results
The models are estimated with a nonproportional random sample
stratified by bank size. The final sample consisted of 227 of the
20
then 530 national banks located in Illinois and Michigan.
The first model, shown in Table 1, contains HF to account for the
sufficient conditions for expense preference behavior, but does not
include a variable to account for the separation of ownership and
control. Clearly, there is no evidence of expense preference behavior
related to the compensation of the CEO. The sign of the coefficient
21
on HF is negative and statistically significant. The results of the
estimates of the model containing measures of both the necessary and
sufficient conditions are shown in Table 2. The inclusion of BOV/N or
BCONT did not change the results. Although the sign on the coef-
ficients for BOWN and BCONT were always positive, the coefficient was
never close to an acceptable level of significance. The sign on the
coefficient of HF remains negative as in the model estimated in Table
1. Thus, the hypothesis that expense preference behavior in banks
results In higher compensation of the CEOs of those banks is rejected.
The estimation provides other Interesting insights into the deter-
mination of compensation levels of bank CEOs. Size is clearly the
most influential determinant of compensation. This result is con-
sistent with the findings of studies of firms in nonregulated markets.
Also, caution should be taken by those who wish to conclude that this
provides evidence that revenue or sales maximization prevails over
profit niaximization. Hank studies reveal limited evidence, at most,
of diseconomies of scale.
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Table 1.
Estimates of the Compensation of
Bank CEOs with Sufficient
Conditions for Expense
Preference Behavior, 1975
(t-values in parentheses)
** ** * **
(1) c = .427 + 0.0124 TD + 5.47P/E + 0.0398 TPOP + 2.42 PCY + 36.76 L/D
(0.036) (8.94) (0.305) (3.615) (1.620) (4.204)
•kic "k ick
+ 0.612 BR + 0.146AG + 0.133YR - 23.61 HF
(4.694) (0.953) (1.657) (-2.368)
R^ = 0.574
ie kk ick iik k
(2) c = -27.02 + 0.0125TD + 380.63IF/L + 0.0364TPOP + 2.29PCY
(0.157) (2.518) (3.35) (1.562)
** ** * **
+ 34.325L/D + 0.582BR + 0.139AG + 0.177YR - 27.45HF
(3.965) (4.514) (0.884) (1.452) (-2.765)
R^ = 0.586
*
Significant at 10% level.
**
Sigificant at 1% level.
-10-
• Table 2.
Estimates of the Compensation of Compensation
of Bank CEOs with Necessary and Sufficient
Conditions for Expense Preference Behavior, 1975
(t-values in parentheses)
c = 10.910 + 0.167TD - 26.803P/E + 0.075TPOP + 0.619PCY
(0.905) (6.279) (-0.998) (1.272) (0.040)
** * **
+ 31.478L/D - 0.085BR + 0.019AG - 0.068YR - 28.161HF
(3.704) (-0.163) (1.293) (-0.584) (-2.516)
+ O.OllBOWN
(0.182) r = 0.39 n = 170
c = -8.537 + 0.165TD + 177.8IF/L + 0.074TPOP + 0.626PCY
(-0.510) (6.173) (1.290) (1.143) (0.409)
+ 31.623L/D - 0.107BR + 0.216AG - 0.048YR - 28.653HF
(3.726) (0.207) (1.439) (-0.412) (-2.560)
+ 0.030BOWN ^
(0.498) r = 0.39 n = 170
c = 11.300 + 0.130TP - 30.931P/E + 0.091TPOP + 0.308PCY
(0.915) (6.400) (-1.111) (1.356) (0.191)
+ 36.100L/D + 0.327BR + 0.248AG - 0.106YR - 37.468HF
(4.066) (0.637) (1.590) (-0.856) (-3.204)
+ 0.024BCONT
(0.527) r = 0.40 n = 163
c = 14.329 + 0.127TD + 24.839IF/L + 0.082TPOP
(-0.853) (6.281) (1.691) (1.313)
+ 0.291PCY + 36.034L/D** + 0.259BR + 0.269AG*
(0.182) (4.080) (0.506) (1.744)
- 0.076YR - 37.606HF + 0.039BCONT
(-0.612) (-3.238) (0.847) r = 0.041 n = 163
^significant at 10% level
**significant at 1% level
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Therefore, even if sales or revenue Tnaxlmization exists it may not be
inconsistent with profit maximization because many of the prices
(interest rates) which generate revenues are fixed. Thus, if costs
are relatively flat and prices are fixed, profits are maximized by
expanding volume. The source of flexibility to generate higher or
lower profits is in the management of the asset portfolio.
The latter phenomenon is confirmed by the positive and significant
coefficient on IF/L, the return on the loan portfolio. In all forms of
the model estimated, IF/L was always significant at the 10 percent level
and in some instances at the 5 percent level. However, P/E was never
a significant determinant of compensation. Therefore, compensation of
a bank's CEO is more closely aligned to the performance of the asset
portfolio than to overall bank performance. The result, then, is con-
sistent with the highly positive and always significant level of the
coefficient of L/D.
The L/D ratio may pick up two influences. A higher L/D ratio may
be exogenously determined by bank market conditions, in which case it
reflects a higher demand for loans but not higher risk loans. On the
other hand, L/D may reflect the risk attitudes of bank ownership. In
either case the CEO is undertaking greater risk because in the former,
there are proportionately fewer liquid assets to cover deposit needs
on loan defaults; and in the latter case, the CEO is making higher risk
loan placements. Thus, the CEO is rewarded for undertaking higher
levels of risk. Because the target level of the L/D ratio is set by the
controlling board the reward system is consistent with the goals of
bank owners.
-12-
The other variables perform generally as expected but usually with
relatively little or no significant explanatory power. The number of
branches a bank has is highly colinear with the size of bank, thus the
sign reversal. Population of the bank-market and per capita income
are always positively associated with levels of compensation, but the
coefficient on PCY is not always significantly different from zero.
Similarly, the coefficients on AG and YR are generally positive with
one or the other being significant. However, in the smaller sample
colinearity results in a sign reversal on YR.
Conclusions
There is no evidence of expense preference behavior significantly
influencing the compensation of CEOs of banks. These results are not
necessarily inconsistent with those of Edwards. Edwards' results could
be interpreted as either expense preference behavior or, alternatively,
as the result of firms in more concentrated markets hiring higher
quality inputs or having superior ability to pass on higher costs to
the consumer.
The significant determinants of compensation of the CEO are con-
sistent with a profit maximizing reward structure. However, the
plaguing issue remains; IF/L is a significant determinant of compensation
, 23but P/E is not. Thus, as Edwards has found, expense preference
behavior may be apparent in areas, other than the compensation of the
CEO, which are not as readily scrutinized by the owners, such as numbers
of employees, buildings, and other types of emoluments.
D/39
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